The Co-management Survey report: an executive summary by Geheb, K. & Crean, K.
The co-management survey report: an executive summary
K. GEHEB LINECIA Ltd., Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project, P. 0. Box 2145, Jieja, Uganda
K. CREAN University ofHulllntemational Fisheries Institute, Cottingham Road, Hull HU6 7RX UK
Introduction
The literature on co-management is both broad and voluminous (see Geheb, i 999a), but typically agrees
that, at its most basic, co-management is a resource management system that shares managerial
responsibility between the state and other stakeholders of a resource. In the case of Lake Victoria, one
would expect the state to be represented by the fisheries departments of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, while
stakeholder groups may comprise fishing communities, fish processing factories and municipalities.
What is contentious within the literature, however, is (a) the amount of power that should be apportioned to
each stakeholder group (effectively, the right to exercise responsibilities); (b) the nature of that power (what
should these responsibilities be?); and, finally, how we shall agree on what powers are involved and who
should be responsible for what.
The first two points - the amount and nature of power
- formed the very basis for the first part of the co-
management survey, for it set out to consider the difficult terrain of 'capacity'. Many observers within East
Africa (and, indeed, the world) are sceptical that members of small-scale fishing communities are able to
perform managerial tasks. Much of the early literature on community participation in fisheries (and other
resource) management specifically tried to show that not only were communities able to perform managerial
tasks, but that they had even developed, implemented and enforced their own (cf. McCay and Aeheson,
1987; Berkes, i 989a). An additional, and very important component of this work, was to counteract the
perspective that, left to themselves, small-scale communities of resource exploiters would inevitably over-
exploit their resource base, an event often referred to as the 'Tragedy of the Commons' (Hardin, 1968).
While the literature has drawn on many examples from across the world (cf. Feeny et al, 1990; Berkes,
1989b; McCay, 1978; McGoodwin, 1990), attention to Africa's
- and, more specifically, Lake Victoria's -
burgeoning common property resource problems has been minimal.
Two main bodies of work in this latter respect may, however, be drawn from. The first, focussing on the
Kenyan part of the lake, identifies a host of community-based organisations and cautiously concludes that if
communities are to be involved in the managerial hierarchy, these nascent institutional forms are an
appropriate basis on which to build this involvement (Geheb, 1997, 1999b). The second body, drawing n
research from Tanzania, concludes that co-management is possible in this sector of the lake, although
fishing communities would want considerable guidance and support from the state (Harris et al. 1998;
Wilson, 1993a, 1993b; Wilson etal, 1999).
To sorne extent, these latter two bodies of work do provide us with data that fishing communities can create
managerial institutions. The Co-management Survey sought to update this information and to take it several
steps further. In order to accomplish these tasks, it defined its overall objectives as follows:
The socio-economie assessment of collective choices within Lake Victoria fishing communities, and
an assessment of access to, and ownership of, beaches, water and/or fish stocks.
The socio-economie assessment of formal institutions with responsibility for the management and
administration of Lake Victoria's fisheries.
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More specifically, the survey's objectives were defined as:
To identify the difficulties and impracticalities inherent in implementing state-based regulations via a
'top-do\vn' management strategy.
To assess the prevalence of community-based instiwtions that either seek to regulate the fishery or
have the potential to be used to regulate it.
(e) To identify ways in which community-bnscd regulatory and monitoly systems may be established,
and how these will fare over time.
(cl) To identify roles for national Fisheries Departments, industrial fish OCCSSOS and other stake
holders'.
(e) To develop well-founded policy suggestions for the establishment of a co-management framework to
manage the fisheries of Lake Victoria.
This introductory paper has two objectives: to firstly consider the extent to which this first part of ihe Co-
management survey has met its objectives. . a doing so, the discussion will refer and comment on papers
contained within this volume. Secondly, to consider what the results from the survey mean for fisheries
management on Lake Victoria generally, iid to make a number of recommeiiclations that fisheries
clepartnìents within the region may want to consider.
Survey objectives and volume contents
Geheb (1997, 1999), Rieclmihler (1994) and others have commented on the shortcomings of state-based,
centralised management systems on Lake Victoria (Kenya), mainly along the grounds that these systems are
too bureaucratic, under-staffed, under-funded and corrupt. The Co-management Survey was based on a
structured interview, and in most cases, sought to identify respondents' opinions on a number of issues. In
the case of how they viewed the state's role in fisheries management, respondents were akecl to comment
on pre-defineci indicators of regulatory efficacy, the extent to which the state could he held responsible for
regulatory failure, the presence of the state at landing sites, and how they felt that management might be
improved.
In this volume, Onyango's paper considers recent initiatives in the management of Tanzania's Lake Victoria
fishery, in which Beach Management Units (BMUs) have been established to implement and enforce state-
based regulations Onyango argues that not only do these represent a lengthening of the already considerable
vertical hierarchy of Tanzanian fisheries administration, but also that because communities do not 'own' the
management of their fishery (this being externally defined), it is unlikely that the BMUs will succeed.
Medard and Geheb's paper suggests that, like other structures imposed on fishing communities under the
U/aiiiaa policies of the Tanzanian Government, the l3MUs and their regulations are likely to be absorbed
into community social structures and cultural life such that they become sociahisech. Hence, the outcome of
this strategy may well be the product of negotiation between the community and the BMU for the fulfilment
of livelihood objectives, and not necessarily fisheries management objectives.
Kyangwa and Geheb's paper explicitly deals with the role of the state in fisheries management in Uganda,
drawing on historical data to argue that there is little to suggest that these systems of administration have
worked. Geheb, in his paper sunlmarising fisheries legislation within the region and commenting on new
directions within fisheries management, argues that changes to the structure of government in Uganda nd
the checentrahisatìori mich clevolution of government responsibilities to the local level, presents us with
potentially the most cogent forni of co-management on the lake, which, lie advocates, communities will
have to grasp if they are to assert their rights within the governmental framework arid stake a Place for
themselves within the management of Lake Victoria's fisheries.
Personnel from the riparian fisheries departments were also interviewed for this survey, and arc presented in
a short paper contained in this volume. None of the papers discuss this chata.
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The questionnaire sought information from respondents about whether or not there existed various types of
organisations on their landings sites (such as co-operatives, fishers' and women's groups) and whether or
not fishing communities had rules that were not of state origin. In addition, the questionnaire presented a
number of problem scenarios, and asked respondents to whom they would go to for help to solve these
conflicts. These questions specifically sought to understand whether or not communities had internal
institutions to solve these kinds of difficulties, or if they persistently relied on external sources of assistance.
Geheb and Crean's paper discusses the institutions to which fishers will turn in the event that they have
certain types of problems, and argues that the people or institutions turned to depend on the type of problem
involved. It would also appear that the country concerned is an important factor because Kenyan and
Ugandan respondents typically turned to internal mechanisms for problem solution, while Tanzanians turned
to government sources for help.
This topic is also discussed to some extent in Medard and Geheb's paper, where they argue that perhaps
Tanzanian communities do not see state institutions as separate from community ones. Because the state
has, for some time, imposed administrative structures at local levels, communities may well perceive these
to be governmental in origin, but not separate from the community itself.
Finally, Medard's paper specifically examines a women's group from Kasheno in the Muleba District of
Tanzania, and concludes that this initiative has been remarkably successful and that the necessary ingredient
for the group's success has been support and recognition by the state. Support and recognition by the state is
often considered an integral component of institutional success and 'robustness'. Abila et aL and Medard
and Geheb both draw on criteria elaborated by Ostrom (1991) to analyse data for Kenya and Tanzania
respectively. Amongst these criteria is that state support is a necessary component to the success and
durability of institutions.
In both the latter papers, the authors conclude that the applicability of Ostrom's criteria is 'patchy' in the
sense that in some places and in some contexts, the criteria do apply, while not in others. In other cases, the
criteria apply to some extent, but not completely. Geheb and Crean's paper examines one of these criteria-
that of boundaries being important - from a regional perspective, and concludes that boundaries are present,
but ambiguous, in the sense that they may apply some of the time, depending on certain circumstances and
the actors involved.
The third objective of the Co-management Survey, to identify ways in which community-based regulatory
and monitoring systems may be established and how these will fare over time, was not considered to any
great degree by the papers in this volume. In large measure, this is because this objective will be met by the
'Four-beaches' Survey, the second part of the Co-management Survey. The 'Four-beaches' Survey will, on
an experimental basis, monitor fishing communities in each of the three countries in order to understand
how best to suggest that institutions be implemented and to watch how these institutions cope over time.
The same is true of the fourth objective, which aims to identify roles for national fisheries departments, fish
processors and other stakeholders within the management structure of Lake Victoria. While waiting for
additional results from the 'Four beaches' Survey, the LVFRP will also be hosting a series of 'stakeholder'
workshops to assist it in answering these latter two objectives as well as the final one of providing well
founded policy prescriptions for the fishery.
This volume puts together, of the first time, regional perspectives on co-management and the extent to
which this nascent concept might apply to Lake Victoria's fisheries. In the next section, we consider the
results themselves from the perspective of what they mean for fisheries managers within the region.
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The co-management survey' s results: implications for management
The questionnaires were divided up into a number of topic areas, and each of these is discussed in turn. The
actual figures to which this section refers eau be derived from the papers on the fishers, fisheries department
personnel and fish processing factories results contained in this volume.
Respondents' backgrounds
A typical Lake Victoria fisher will be male, married, in his early 30s and will have had some primary level
education. Ugandan and Kenyan fishers are more likely to have liad some secondary education than
Tanzanian fishers. The largest proportion of fishers will have fished for over 11 years which means that
many will be able to remember how the fishery was early in the 1980's. The next largest group of fishers
had fished for between two and five years, which suggests that the fishery remains an attractive employment
option to many young men in the basin. Most fishers target Nile perch. This was especially the case in
Tanzania. In Kenya and Uganda, fishers' employment in the dagaa and tilapia fisheries remains veiy
important,
Perceptions ofresource change
Respondents were asked what they thought the single worst problem on Lake Victoria was. In Uganda, the
largest proportion identified illegal fishing techniques, followed by corruption and gear theft. In Kenya, the
largest proportion identified declining catches, lack of regulation and gear theft. In Tanzania, the largest
proportion identified illegal fishing techniques followed by gear theft and lack of regulation.
These results mean that perceIved problems on the lake will vary by country. It is important to note that
there is a high regional concern lör lack ofregalation, the use ofillegal fishing gear and gear theft.
Questions about resource change were based on a five-year period from 1995 to 1999. Fishers were asked if
they thought that there was less fish now, if the length of fishing trips had increased, if fish species diversity
had declined, if the number of boats liad increased, if the average size of fish had declined, if there were
more illegal fishing techniques, and whether or not fishing now pays less. In most cases, fishers strongly
agreed with these statements. In Tanzania, however, only just over half of the respondents interviewed
agreed that average fish sizes had declined.
What this means is that not only do fishers' perceptions confim1 biological reports that the fishery is on
decline ('cf Tweddle and Cowx, 2000). but it is possible that fishing communities may even be able to be
used as a basis for data collection (cf Ticheler et al., 1998). It also means that fisheries managers have every
reason to be highly concerned about fishing trends on Lake Victoria.
Reasons for scarcity
There were no clear majorities for why Lake Victoria's fisheries were on the decline. The three most
popular reasons were: (a) that there were too many boats, nets and/or fishers (b) that regulations were being
disobeyed, and (e) because of pollution and/or water hyacinth. Thus last reason was the second most popular
ìn Tanzania, and rarely mentioned in Kenya and Uganda, where high effort levels and regulatory
disobedience were regarded as the most important factors.
What this means is that fishers typically have a good idea of what is wrong with the fishery. As we shall see
belo fishers do agree that the regulations are by and large good (in the sense that they should tackle these
negative trcnd), but, if strongly implemented, ha ve the potential to be very controversial.
Respondents were asked why they thought the use of illegal gear had increased. Wide support was obtained
for the suggestion that this was because no fish would be caught unless small mesh-sizes were used, and that
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small mesh-sizes are cheaper than large mesh-sizes. This latter characteristic was especially strong in
Uganda. Just over half of Kenyan and Ugandan respondents did not feel that the use of illegal gear occurred
because the fisheries departments were not doing their jobs well. A very large majority of Tanzanian
respondents disagreed that their fisheries department was failing in its task.
The latter results are interesting. While many fishers agree that illegal gear is being used, they do not
necessarily think that this is because their fisheries departments are doing a badjob. This was especially so
in Tanzania. The fact that many thought that illegal gear use had increased was because it was cheaper than
legal gear may indicate that sales of illegal fishing gear are sufficiently hih that outlets can lower thefr
prices.
Increasing stocks and investment
Despite observing general declines in the fishery, 62% of fishers interviewed felt that there were one or
more species on the lake that had increased in abundance over the past few years. Just over half of these
responses identified Nile perch as having increased, followed by 20% who thought it was tilapia and then
dagaa. Interestingly, some fishers felt that mud fish (Clarias spp.) and lung fish had increased beneath water
hyacinth mats, and in Tanzania there were a number of fishers who said Haplochornines were on the
increase, suggesting that recent speculation that numbers of these species are on the increase around rocky
refugia (cf. Seehausen, 1995; Seehausen and Witte, 1995). In these latter cases, these observations are again
testimony to the ability of fishers to observe changes within their fishery.
Most of our respondents felt that there were fish stocks that had attracted more investment than other stocks
over the past five years. In most cases, this was the Nile perch, and respondents said that this was because of
the high demand for the fish as well as its abundance. If respondents mentioned tilapia as the species
attracting investment, it was usually because demand for this species was high, while if it was dagaa that
was drawing investment, it was usually because this species was abundant.
What the above results mean is that the Lake Victoria 's fisheries continue to attract investment, particularly
the Nile perch. This is just as well seeing that respondents also felt that this fish 's abundance had also
increased.
Actions to be taken
Respondents were presented with a number of scenarios as possible suggestions for future management
directions. The following suggestions obtained majority support in all three countries: that the government
and fishing communities must take fisheries regulations more seriously; fishing communities should be
allowed to punish offenders; fisheries department personnel should be stationed at every beach; and that
fishing communities should be allowed to participate in rule-making. Respondents in all three countries
were reluctant about the idea that no more fishers, boats and/or nets should be allowed on the lake. Ugandan
fishers strongly supported the idea that they should be allowed to say who could and who could not fish. A
minority of Kenyans agreed with this proposal as did just over half of Tanzanians. Ugandan fishers were
also keen on the idea that they should be allowed to claim as their own the waters that they fished, while a
minority of Kenyans agreed. Just over half of Tanzanians agreed that they should have this right.
The above results mean that Ugandan fishers may well be more eager to assume managerial responsibilities
than their Tanzanian and Kenyan counterparts. In these latter two countries, the most pop ular responsibility
was the right to punish offenders. The majority ofresp on dents appear to feel that fisheries management has
to be carried out with the state. A management measure that restricted effort would almost certainly meet
with resistance.
s
The role of the state
We asked respondents a number of questions concerning their opinions on various state inputs. A small
majority of fishers believe that state fisheries regulations are good, the largest proportion of whom came
from Tanzania. The majority of respondents said that people do tend to obey these regulations, and that they
feel that their relationship with the fisheries departments is good. Just over half of Kenyan respondents felt
that the Fisheries Department did a poor job protecting fish stocks, while a minority in Tanzanian and
Uganda felt that this was so. Kenyan respondents were more likely to say that they saw fishers breakihg
fisheries regulations 'all the time' than their Ugandan and Tanzanian counterparts.
In many cases, fishers are reluctant to criticise their fisheries departments. The reason why we say this is
because, on rhe one hand, fishers acknowledge that regulations are being broken and that the fishery is on
the decline; and, on the other hand, they seem to see no relationshio between these trends and the activities
of the fisheries departments. It seems plausible, therefore that fishers may well believe that there is a
relationshijo between a declining fishery and regulatory failure, but are too scared or cautious to comment on
it.
Externalities
Externalities are problems that are specific to Common Pool Resources (CPRs) such as fisheries. The most
common problem is that of excessive effort, which occurs because fisheries are difficult to 'close' to
outsiders. When everyone in the fishery experiences a problem arising from an externality, much of the
theory on the subject anticipates that the ground is fertile for cooperative management to take place.
The majority of Tanzanians agreed that if there were many boats in the places where they fished, they would
not get enough fish. A minority of Ugandans and Tanzanians agreed. Most respondents agreed that their
gear tangled with that of others, while a small majority of Ugandans and Tanzanians agreed that if they got
to their fishing grounds late, they would catch no fish. All respondents agreed that if they caught small fish,
there would be no big ones left to catch later.
What these results mean is that Lake Victoria s fishers are close to perceiving a relationshmjo between their
own activities and the declining stock, if they do not do so already
Collective activities
Most of the region's fishers said that they could identify everyone by sight in their villages; most said rh.it
they were prepared to fish in the saine place as other fishers; most fishers will go to the lake with the same
fishers every day. Roughly half of the lake's fishers will tell their fellow fishers if they find a good fishing
spot.
What these results mean is that there is a sufficiently high degree of familiarity and camaraderie between
fishers that monitoring systems may be a viable responsibility for fishers to assume. The familiarity that
fishers share may also be the basis on which to build other management responsibilities for fishing
communities.
In Uganda and Kenya, when fishers experience problems within the fishery, or in teiiiis of conflicts between
themselves and/or other communities, they will seek internal solutions to their problems. Unlike most
Tanzanians, in other words, Kenyans and Ugandans will not normally attempt to solve their problems by
going to a governmental source of solution such as the fisheries departments or the police.
This means that Kenyans and Ugandans do not feel that their governments have a role to play in solving
their own internal confficts, while Tanzanian fishers often do. These results may pro vide some guidance for
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deteiniining the degree of government influence that should be applied in a regional co-managerial
framework
Respondents believe that the water in Lake Victoria is either owned by no one or by the government. A
large majority of respondents said that anyone could fish these waters. These responses would appear to
contradict later results, which suggest that fishers do not think that they can fish in another community's
waters without first obtaining permission.
Most respondents believed that the beaches from which they fish belonged to the state, but, at the same time,
also felt that outsiders coming to their landings would have to seek permission to fish first from the landing
authorities.
These results mean that, at some levels, fishers believe that they have certain responsibilities over the lake
and who fishes it. In particular, these revolve around seeking permission from communities before nue
either fishes their waters, or fishes from their landing sites. These rules may well be a direct result of
concerns over high levels of theft on the lake. It is worrying that fishers do not see the lake generally as
being 'theirs
Most Ugandan fishers say that they will fish anywhere in the lake, but most Kenyan and Tanzanian fishers
say that they will not. In particular, fishers said they would not fish in fish nurseries or closed areas.
These results reinforce the previous ones, because they indicate that fishers feel a moral obligation not to
fish in nurseries. There is some evidence, however, that fishers do not know where these are. If fishers do
feel that it is morally vxong to fish in nurseries, these may serve as a basis around which to build some types
ofregulations.
Respondents were asked whether a series of organisations existed on their landing sites, and the most
commonly identified were beach committees, followed by co-operatives and marketing groups.
Formal organisation does exist at landing sites and should be used as a conduit for regulation.
17% of respondents said that, at their landings, they had no rules that were of community origin. Over half
of Tanzanian respondents said that this was the case, while in Kenya and Uganda, the most common rules
are restrictions on fishing methods and/or gear, and restrictions on when to fish.
The presence of such rules should be encouraged, particularly if they merge with management objectives. In
Tanzania, go vernment presence at the very local level obscures or pushes aside community regulations, and
can be used for the same puìpose.
Perspectives on fisheries regulations
It is surprising that most respondents feel that the fisheries regulations within their countries are effective,
particularly in the light of widespread agreement that catches are on the decline and that illegal fishing gear
and/or techniques are commonly used. Over three quarters of Tanzanian and Ugandan respondents identified
the minimum mesh-size for gill nets as 127 mm., while just over half of Kenyan respondents did not know
what it was.
These results suggest, on the one band, that respondents may not consider there to be a relationshijo betw -'n
fishing regulations and the status of the fish stock In Kenya, the lack ofknowledge of the minithum mesh-
size for gill nets is ofgreat concern.
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The fisheries departmentpem'onn el interviews
Out of 25 Fisheries Officers interviewed, eight did not know what the minimum mesh-size for gill nets was.
One of these was Tanzanian, three were Kenyan and four were Ugandan'.
This finding is worrying. While one miht expect that to some extent fishers will not know what mimthum
mesh-sizes are, one would expect all fisheries officers to know this most basic ofregulatory tenets.
Most Officers interviewed felt that the control of illegal mesh-sizes and gear were the most difficult
regulations to enforce, while the remaining Officers felt that all regulations were difficult to enforce. The
majority of Kenyan Officers believed that most of the nets on Lake Victoria were illegal, while most
Ugandan and Tanzanian Officers disagreed that this was the case. Officers generally did not think that per
capita catches were on the increase. The majority of Kenyan and Ugandan Officers believed that most of
their fishers had fishing licenses, and Officers from all three riparian states believed that most of the lake's
boats were registered. A minority of officers agreed that the present fisheries regulations were the best that
there could be. A large majority believed that regulation might be improved via some form of arrangement
between the fisheries departments and the fishing communities.
Officers, therefore, agree that some regulation
- such as boat registration and fisher's licensing - is effective
on the lake, but, at the same time, worry that catches are on the decline and the present regulations are not
the best possible.
In Uganda, Officers complained that lack of funds followed by low staff numbers were the greatest
impediments to their work. In Kenya, most officers worried about having too few vehicles and/or boats,
while in Tanzania, most complained about lack of funding, followed by lack of staff numbers and too few
vehicles and/air boats.
Officers, then, do perceive severe logistical constraints to their work
The survey offish processing factories
Representatives of 21 factories throughout the region were visited. When asked whether or not they would
be prepared to contribute funding towards the management of Lake Victoria's resources, five said that they
would not, usually because they felt that they paid enough taxes as it was. The remainder said that they were
prepared to offer funds, most often towards 'sensitising' communities about various things, and contributing
towards the promotion of legal fishing.
Provided factories could be assured that their funds would be spent in productive areas, theymay well be an
important source offun ding for future management.
The factories were also presented with a number of possible funding areas that they might potentially
consider making contributions for. The majority were in favour of making contributions towards quality
assurance between the point of fish capture to the factory, ensuring that the minimum fish size is not landed.
The majority were not interested in providing funds towards fisheries department patrols, transport
infrastructure, fisheries department salaries nor a management structure overseen by fishers' organisations.
The latter suggests that factories are weary of funding both the fisheries departments and management by
fishers' organisations, either because they feel these should th any case be paid for by the taxes theypay, or
because they do not feel that either the fisheries departments nor fishers' organisations can be trusted.
'There is no legally stipulated minimum mesh-size in the Ugandan waters of Lake Victoria, although the 127 mm.
minimum is informally accepted.
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The factories were asked what they understood 'co-management' to mean. Two had no idea, while the rest
viewed it as some sort of collaborative arrangement between the state and 'stakeholders'.
Just over half of the factories felt that the fisheries departments were not doing a 'good job' on the lake, but
most did not see the fisheries departments as a hindrance to their work. The factories were asked in what
ways they would change the way in which the fisheries departments operated and this produced a wide
variety of answers. Readers are encouraged to view these in the relevant paper.
Although the majority of factories said that they were less likely to run at full capacity now than they were
five years ago, most disagreed that the fish landed now were typically smaller than they used to be, and the
quality of the fish they bought was consistently high. When asked to account for whatever supply problems
they had, the majority agreed that these, in part, were due to high demands from the processing industry and
because of the failure to manage the lake effectively. The majority did not think that excessive effort levels
contributed to supply problems, nor that their suppliers could not meet their quality standards.
Concluding recommendations
Future management plans should emphasise flexibility so that they may cope with a wide range of
ethnic backgrounds, cultures, economies, policies and localised resource constraints.
Efforts should be made to incorporate fishing communities in the monitoring of the resource base as a
low cost alternative to costly stock-assessment programmes.
(e) Mechanisms to alter the cost of non-recommended gear should be considered. For example, taxes on
under-sized gear could be made prohibitively high, while taxes on legal meshes could be made low or
non-existent. This would focus regulation on gear suppliers, which are fewer in number than fishers.
With the Nile perch fishery still attracting investment and making major economic contributions to
the riparian states, the importance of controlling it is paramount. Measures that include the fish
processing factories in the monitoring process should be considered.
Fisheries department staff should be trained in fisheries regulations. Other changes to fisheries
departments that may be considered are reductions size, increases in salaries and tough entry
requirements. Fisheries department's roles in the field of extension should be increased commensurate
with fishing communities' increased roles in enforcement.
Fishing communities' roles in the management of the fisheries should, at present, be based on the
right to punish offenders; the right to formulate by-laws; and the right to contribute to the process of
formulating regulations.
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